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The only other question which we deem it our duty to consider,
is as to the competency of the witness Jacob Shafer, Jr., one of
the payees of the note, and who had also subsequently endorsed
it. 'It is unnecessaty to discuss his interest in the suit, as, interested or not, he was incompetent. It is now settled by Baily v.
Knapp, 7 Harris 192, Katz v. Snyder, 2 Casey 511, and Foreman v. AN, 5 P. F. Smith 325, that the rule furnished by Post
v. Avery, 5 W. & S. 509, is applicable to payees, who have transferred negotiable paper by endorsement. This renders immaterial all the questions which arose upon the testimony of the witness, who ought not to have been heard. Besides which, not one
of the assignments of error is in accordance with the rules of
court, and might, with propriety, be dismissed on that ground
alone.
Judgment reversed, and venire faeias de novo awarded.
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AGENT.

When Agent may sue in his Own Name-Responsibility of Telegraph
Companies for Failure to transmit Despatches.-Where an agent is
interested, as for commissions, or by reason of special property in the
subject-matter, and the contract in reference thereto is made in his name,
it is perfectly competent for him to sue and maintain an action in his
own name as if he were the principal: United ,States Telegraph Co. v.
Gildersleve, 29 Md.
This is so in the case of a factor, or a broker, or a warehouseman, or
carrier, an auctioneer, a policy broker, whose name is on the policy, or
the -captain of a hip for freight: Id.
So where a contract is in terms made with an agent personally, he
may sue thereon; and if an agent in his own name carry on abusiness
for his principal, and appear to be the proprietor, and sell goods in the
I From the Judges. The cases, which were decided at the January Term 1869,
will be reported in 42 or 43 Ala. Rep.
2 From J. E. Hale, State Reporter; to appear in 36 Cal. Rep.
s From J. S. Stockett, State Reporter; to appear in 29 Md. Rep.
4 From P. Frazer Smith, State Reporter; to appear in 59 Pa. Rep.
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trade as such apparent owner, he can sustain au action in his own name
for the price: Id.
Where a broker sent by telegraph, in his own name, an order for the
purchase of gold, on behalf of his principal, and the telegraph company
failed to transmit the order. ileld:1. That the broker may sue the telegraph company in his own name,
on the contract to transmit the order, and recover the full amount of
damages resulting from a breach of the contract. But that he of course
sues and recovers as trustee for his principal:
2. That the company had a clear right to protect itself against extraordinary risk anct liability, by such rules and regulations as might be
required for the purpose:
S. That as the message was not required to be repeated, and there was
no special agreement for the insurance of its transmission, the company,
th6ough bound to use due diligence, was not bound to use extraordinary
care and precaution :
4. That, having refused to pay the extra charge for repetition or
insurance, the broker had no right to rely upon the declaration of the
company's agent, that the message had gone through, in order to fix
liability on the company: Id.
In a suit by a broker against a telegraph company to recover the damages resulting from the failure to transmit a despatch containing the following order "sell fity (50) gold," it was proved that the despatch
would be understood among brokers to mean fifty thousand dollars of
gold, but it was not shown that the company's agents so understood it.
Held, that the nature of this despatch should have been communicated
to the company's agent at the time it was offered to be sent, in order
that the company might have observed the precautions necessary to guard
itself against the risk; and it was error to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover to the full extent of his loss' by the
decline in gold: Id.
BILLS AND NoTEs.
-Motice of Dishonor sent through Post-Ofice.-The free delivery of letters being established and regulated by law, it seems proper the rule in
this state should be that where, as in cities, &c., there is a letter-carrier,
who carries letters daily from the post-office and delivers them daily at
the house and places of business of those who are accustomed to receive
letters by him, if a notice of dishonor is left at the post-office in time to
go by such carrier on the same day to the party, it will be deemed sufficient: Bhoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 59 Pa.
CONFEDERATE STATES.

See timitations.

The so-called Confederate Government, and the rebel government in
the state of Alabama, were neither of them in the proper legal sense de
facto governments during the late rebellion: Chisholm v. Coleman,
S. C. Ala.
The government in Alabama, during that period did not, and did not
claim to, exercise the powers of the loyal, rightful government of said
state, under the Constitution of the United States, nor was it, nor did
it claim to be, the government of said state that was admitted into the
Union, under the laws and Constitution of the United States, in the
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year 1819-did not claim or pretend to be that government-that
government it destroyed. It claimed to be and was, a new, separate, and
distinct government-a government forming, and being a constituent
part and member of the said Confederate Government, in open and flagrant hostility to, and war against, the United States; and the said
rightful government of said state: Id.
A government de facto, whose acts bind the rightful government, is a
government that gets the possession and control of the rightful government, and maintains itself there by force and arms against the will of
the rightful government, and claims to exercise tlheyowers thereof: Id.
A judge of the Circuit Court of the state of Alabama, elected befbre
the act of secession, who after that act enters the military service, and
takes an office in the armies of the Confederate States, and receives the
pay thereof, thereby forfeits and vacates his office of judge under the
state of Alabama; and there was no necessity there should be any
judicial proceeding to try and determine the fact of forfeiture and
vacancy: Id.
The present legitimate loyal government of Alabama is not bound nor
under any obligations, either moral or legal, to pay the salary of such
judge while he was serving the illegal, rebel government in said
state: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

Right of Suffrage.-A right conferred by the constitution is beyond
the reach of legislative interference: Mc Cafferty v. Guyer et al., 59 Pa.
The legislature cannot confer the right to vote upon any classes but
those to whom it is given by the constitution; the description of those
entitled excludes all others: Id.
The 3d article of the constitution is not merely a general provision
defining the indispensable rights of an elector, leaving the legislature
to determine who may be excluded. Itis a description of who shall not
be excluded: Id.
The Act of June 11th 1866 (for disfranchising deserters) is unconstitutional: Id.
CONTRACT.

Consideration.-In a suit against the owner of houses by a lumber
merchant for lumber furnished to the contractor, evidence that at a settlement between the contractor and owner, the contractor admitted the
owner's book to be correct, H7eld to be inadmissible: Landis v. Royer ,
59 Pa.
MIaterials furnished on the credit of a building, are a sufficient consideration for the owner's subsequent promise to pay: Id.
- A benefit derived from unsolicited services creates a moral obligation,
which is a sufficient consideration for an express assumption, but will
not raise an implied assumption: Id.
Materials for a building were furnished to a contractor on the credit
of the building, and charged to him: there was evidence that the owner
promised to pay for them. Held, that if the promise was a direct and
absolute engagement to pay on a consideration moving to himself, and
at the time the claim was a lien, it was the debt of the defendant's own
building, whose payment could be enforced against it, and although noi
personally his debt, his promise was in relief of his property-not the

ABSTRACTS OF RECtNT DECISIONS.

debt of another and not within the Act of April 26th 1855 (Frauds):
Id.
DAMAGES. See Agent.
FraudulentSale.-A., being part owner of a vessel and authorized to
appoint her master, agreed with B., who applied for tile appointment, to
appoint him, in consideration that he would take an eighth interest in
the vessel at her cost price. A. fraudulently represented the cost price
of the vessel to have been $34,000, and received from B. the one-eighth
part of that sum. B. subsequently learned that the cost price of the
vessel was very much less than that which A. represented it to have
been. Held:-'
1st. That B. was entitled to recover from A. for the over-payment,
even if the actual value of the share purchased equalled or exceeded
what it would have been, had the representation been true:
2d. And that the measure of damages was either the difference between
one-eighth of the actual and one-eighth of the represented cost of the
vessel, or one-eighth of the difference between the actual and represented cost.of the entire vessel: Pendergast v. Reed, 29 Md.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Dischargeof Insolvnt.-An express promise by a debtor, after his
discharge under the insolvent laws, to pay a prior debt, waives the discharge: Knight v. 2Touse, 29 Md.
Voluntary -Payment.-Wberea person with full knowledge of the
facts, voluntarily pays a demand unjustly made upon him, though
attempted or threatened to be enforced by proceedings, it will not be
considered as paid by compulsion, and the party thus paying is not entitled to recover back the money paid, though he may have protested
against the unfounded claim at the time of payment made: Lester v.
The Mayor, 29 Md.
Whare money has been paid under a mistake of the facts, or under
circumstances of fraud or extortion, or as a necessary means to obtain
the possession of goods wrongfully withheld from the party paying the
money, an action may be maintained for the money #rongfully exacted:
.d.
But such action is not maintainable in the naked ease of a party making payment of a demand rather than resort to litigation, and under the
supposition that the claim which subsequently turned out to be unauthorized by law, was enforceable against him, or his property: Id.
Security for future Advances.-A judgment as well as a mortgage,
may be taken to secure future advances and liabilities, when such is a
constituent part of the original agreement under which it was entered;
and any future advatices not exceeding the amount of the judgment
made thereunder, will be covered thereby: Neidig, Administratrix of
Neidig, v. Whiteford, 29 Md.
A debtor has the right, if he so elect, to make the application of payments in the first instance, and if he omit so to do, the creditor may
make the appropriation; but if neither make any appropriation, the law
appropriates the payment, to the earliest, and generally the most onerous
debt: Id.
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On the 24th of July 1856, W. confessed a judgment in favor of A.,
as collateral security for such balance as was due on account to the latter at the date of the judgment. There was a running account between
the parties, commencing before the date of the judgment, kept alone by
the- creditor, and which continued until May 1857. Subsequently to
the date of the judgment, large and numerous credits were entered in the
account, greatly exceeding in amount the balance due on the account
at the time the judgment was rendered. Held, that the judgment was
discharged by the subsequent payments on account: Id.
EJE TMENT.

Wirit of Possession-Executionof.-Prma facie all who come into
possession of the~land, pending the action to re'cover possession, must
go out under the writ of possession, if the plaintiff recovers, for the
presumption is that they came A under the defendant: Ifetlherbee v.
Dunn, 36 Cal.
If the defendant, pending an action against him to recover possession
of land, colludes with another person to obtain judgment against him
for possession, and to be placed in possession by a writ of restitution,
such other person must go out under a writ of possession against the
defendant. He will not be protected by his judgment, if it was collusively obtained: Id.
EQUITY.

Relief from Contract on Ground of Xistae.-Where parties have
presupposed facts or rights to exist as the basis of their contracts, which.
did not, such contracts made in mutual mistake will be relieved against:
Watts v. Cummins, 59 Pa.
The principle in such cases is, that the party has been misled to his
hurt, in trusting to the truth of the other in a material matter, where he
has had no opportunity of satisfying himself of its reality, or has been
prevented from taking the steps necessary to verify the assertion : 17.
When a party asks a chancellor to restrain the inequitable use of a
legal title, he must show such facts as entitle him to rescind on the
ground of either riistake or fraud: Id.
The defendant who had given a'note for a share in a tract of oil land
defended, on the ground of misrepresentation. The judge below, after
referring to the evidence, and the excitement in relation to such land,
charged: "If Watts, the defendant, was seized with this oil fever, like
multitudes of others, and was induced to subscribe by representations
that Campbell, the agent of the owners of the land, believed to be true,
a persuasion that was shared by the best informed men who visited and
examined the territory, he cannot allege that he was deceived and
defrauded by such representations. But if you can find evidence that
Campbell made these representations knowing them to be false, aaid that
he made them by the direction and authority of the owners, and for the
purpose of obtaining Watts's note, and that Watts signed the paper and
gave the note in consequence of these false representations, you will be
warranted in rendering a verdict for the defendant." Held, not o be
error : Id.
.Iiles 7. Stevens, 3 Barr 21, explained: id.
Practice.-If a defendant in a chancery suit is sought to be made a
party, in his own right as heir at law, and as executor or administrator,
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the bill should state the fact, and pray process against him in both cliaracters, otherwise he will be held to be a party only in the character in
which process is prayed against him: Carter v. Ingraham, S. C. Ala.
In such a case, if process is prayed against the defendant in one character only, the register has no authority to issue process against him in
both; the process should follow the prayer in the bill of complaint: Id.
Specific Performance-Demandfor Deed, how far llNaterial.-In an
action for the specific performance of a trust by the execution of a deed,,.
a demand therefor before suit is only material as affecting costs. Without such demand .the action may be maintained, but the plaintiff will not
be entitled to costs: Jones v. CUtil of Petalunma, 36 Cal.
EsvorrEL.
Former Judgment.-The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a material matter, put directly in issue by the pleadings, is
res adidiccataas to that issue, and the parties are estopped by the judgment from litigating it a-ain: Jackson v. Lodge, 36 Cal.
If the defence made by sureties to a promissory note is, that a deed
to a tract of land has been given to the plaintiff by the principal to the
note, in satisfaction thereof, and the case is tried on this issue, and judgment rendered for the defendants, this is res adjudicataas to that issue;
and the same matter cannot be again litigated between the parties in an
action to recover possession of the land: Id.
EVIDENCE.

Experts.-In an action against the executors of her father on a note
given to a daughter, the plea being non estfactum, the will of the father
dated before the note, stating as a reason for excluding her from any
part of his o6tate, that she had received her share in a farm sold-to her
husband much below its value, was irrelevant, and inadmissible: Rouch
v. Zekring, 59 Pa.
If the fact were material, it could not be proved by the declaration
of the obligor: Id.
The plaintiff afterwards gave evidence to rebut the declaration in the
will. Held, that this did not cure the error in admitting the will: Id.
The opinion of an expert must be predicated on facts proved or admitted, or such as appear in evidence hypothetically stated. One not
an expert must give facts and circumstances within his own knowledge
as the ground of his opinion: Id.
Declarations of the obligor, shortly after the execution of the note,
that he had not signed it were admissible, not as evidence that he had
not signed, but to show want of memory and understanding about what
he had done: Id.
Receipts.-There is a distinction as to oral testimony, between solemn
contracts inter partes in writing executed and delivered, and receipts,
the acknowledgment of one party only: Batdorfv. Albert, 59 Pa.
Receipts, when mere acknowledgments of delivery or payment, are
but primi2facie evidence of the facts, and not conclusive: the facts may
be contradicted by oral testimony: rd.
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EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
Promise to Pay Legacy.-There is no consideration for the promise of
an executor to pay a legacy beyond the assets in his hands. The consideration and promise must be co-extensive: Okeson's Appeal, 59 Pa.
An executor cannot be made liable de bonis propriis on an oral promise, on the mere consideration of assets: such promise would be within
the Act of April 26th 1855 (Frauds): Id.
Liability of-An administrator who fails to make and return an
inventory of the estate he represents, as required by law, is subject to
removal for such failure: Oglesby v. Howard, S. C. Ala.
An administrator who fails to collect the debts of the estate he represents when they become due, or collects the same In illegal and worthless
funds, is guilty of a devastavit, and he is subject to removal for the same,
unless a sufficient excuse is shown for such failure: Id.
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS.

Transfer of Cause from a State Cozrt to a -Federal Court.-This
Court has no jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandate to compel the judge
of a District Court to proceed with the trial of an action commenced
therein, in which an order has been made by said District Court directing the cause to be transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States
for trial, for the alleged reason that the parties thereto are citizens of
different states: Francisco v. .anhattan Ins. Co., 36 Cal.
In such case the subject-matter of said order of the District Court is
within its jurisdiction, and is not void, even if erroneous. It cannot be
reviewed by this court on application for mandamus. Moreover, the
party aggrieved thereby has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy -by
the due course of law: Id.
FORWARDERS.

Liabilityfor Want of Ordinary Care and Diligence.-H. delivered
to the Central Ohio Railroad Company, at Newark, Ohio, two hundred
and fifty barrels of coal oil to be transported to Bell Air in the same state,
by the said company; thence by way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
to Baltimore, and thence by steamer to New York, there to be delivered
to S., or his assigns. The oil was delivered to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company at Bell Air, and reached Baltimore, where upon being
taken from the cars of the company, it was placed in an open lot near
their warehouse on Locust Point, and thence forwarded to New York,
where upon its arrival, it was ascertained there was a deficiency in quantity of sixty-seven barrels. Held:1. That the responsibility of the proper custody and storage of the oil
after it was unladen from the cars in Baltimore, attached to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, as warehousemen and forwarders,
and they were bound to use ordinary care and diligence in its protection :
2. That S. was entitled to recover from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for such loss of the oil by leakage, while in their custody
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after it was unladen from their cars, as was occasioned by their neglect
or want of ordinary care as warehousemen and forwarders, as could be
established to the satisfaction of the jury, by competent and admissible
evidence: B. and 0. R. R. Co. v. Schumacher, 29 Md.
FRAUDS,

STATUTE OF.

JUDG3IENT.

See Contract-Executor.

See Debtor and Creditor-Estoppel.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

brew Promise made on Snday-Act of Congress relating to the Con.
fiscation of Proerty ofPersons engaged in the Confederate Service.bn the 23d of March 1861, A., a resident of Maryland, made his promissory note in favor of B., payable ninety days after date. B. passed
the note away and entered the Confederate army, and did not return to
Maryland till the war was over. Before maturity the note came into
the possession of a bank in Baltimore, and at maturity was protested for
non-payment, and remained in the possession and ownership of the bank
until the war was ended. After the war B. again became the owner of
the note for a valuable consideration, and brought suit 6n it against
A., who pleaded the Statute of Limitations, to which B. replied a new
promise, which at the trial was shown to have been made on Sunday.
Held :1st. That the Code of Public General Laws, Art. 30, see. 178, does
not prevent the acknowledgment or new promise made on Sunday, from
being used in evidence, for the purpose of removing the bar of the
Statute of Limitations:
2d. That there was nothing in the Act of Congress of 1862, ch. 195,
that could by any latitude of construction be held as intending to prevent a party situated as the plaintiff was, from purchasing notefr
acquiring property after the close of the war, or as making such property liable to seizure and confiscation:
3d. Nor was it necessary that the plaintiff should have obtained a pardon or have complied with the provisions of the amnesty proclamation of
the 29th of May 1865, before he could sue upon the note so acquired:
4th. That the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest upon the note
pending the war: Thomas v. Hunter, 29 Md.
Lis PENDENS.

Abatement of Action.-In an action to recover land, an answer ofanother action pending for the same cause must show that the same title,
the same injury, and the same subject-matter are in controversy in both
actions : Larco v. Clements, 36 Cal.
MECHANICS' LIEN.

Sea Contract.

Repairs and Alterations.-Repairs and alterations of a building,
which do not fairly change its exterior into a new structure, cannot confer a lien : Miller v. Hershey,, 59 Pa.
It is the extent and character of the alterations, and not the change
of purpose, which makes the difference between an old or new building:
id.
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Newness of structure in the main mass of the building-that entire
change of external appearance which denotes a different building from
that which gave place to it, though some parts of the old may have
been retained-is that which constitutes a new building, as distinguished
from one altered: Id.
The building should present that external change indicating newness of structure, which would put purchasers and lien-creditors upon
inquiry : Id.
NUISANCE.
Public and Private 'uisance.-A public nuisance may also be a private nuisance, and if so, the person thereby injured may have his action:
County of Yolo v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal.
The diversion of the waters of a navigable stream may be both a public and a private nuisance: Id.
In so far as a wingdam in a navigable river obstructs the navigation,
it is a public nuisance; but if it obstructs the reclamation of swamp
lands, it is a private nuisance :, l.
The abatement of a nuisance, and the recovery of damages therefor,
are not distinct causes of action, which cannot be united in the same
complaint, but merely different kinds of relief to which the plaintiff
may be entitled where a nuisance is the cause of action: Id.
PARTITION.
Parties.-In partition, all the tenants in common should be made
parties. One tenant in common who owns an undivided interest consisting of a certain quantity, cannot have partition by making the original holder of the whole tract sole defendant, when he has sold divers
parts thereof to various persons, but retains more than the quantity to
wjgch the plaintiff in the partition suit is entitled. All the grantees
of-the original owner should be joined as parties: Sutter v. San Francisco, 36 Cal.
PARTNERSHIP.
Fraudulent Transfers of Partne:ship Property.-While the members of a solvent partnership by their own acts may convert the joint
property of the partnership into the separate property of individuals, or
into the joint property of two or more partners, when done in good
faith, such conversions or transfers, when fraudulent and calculated to
hinder and delay the partnership creditors, are void as against such
creditors and will not be allowed to operate to their prejudice: Flack v.
Charon, 29 Md.
While it is true that the joint creditors, as such, have no immediate
or direct lien upon the partnership property, yet they have a derivative
or secondary lien that can be worked out and made effectual through the
lien of the partners; and which guasi or secondary lien of the creditors,
constitutes an equity, that courts will recognise and protect, against the
meditated fraud of the partners themselves: Id.
And hence while the joint creditors have no right to impeach or call
into question the bon d fide sales or transfers of the partnership property,
it has been uniformly held that it was necessary to the validity of such
sales or transfers, as against the creditors, that they should be fair and
bonafide; and where they have been found otherwise, they have been
declared inoperative as against creditors: Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
FraudulentDebt-Liability of Partnersfor.-Tbe fraudulent intent
of a party to procure goods without payment is consummated when the
possession of the goods is obtained without payment on delivery, or on
call, according to the terms of sale. The debt, under such circumstances,
is fraudulently contracted: Stewart v. Levy, 36 Cal.
In case of a debt fraudulently contracted by a partnership firm by one
member alone, the others being ignorant of the fraud, while all the
members will be bound in an action brought on the contract or to recover the property so fraudulently obtained, yet the liability to an action
for the fraud which is essentially different and involves moral turpitude,
is limited to the partner committing the same, unless the others assented
to the fraud, or ratified it by adopting the act of the fraudulent partner,
or retaining its fruits with knowledge of the fraud: Id.
PAYMENT.

See Debtor and Creditor.

PUBLIC OFFICER.

Liability.of.-Although public officers should be made to answer in
damages to all persons who may have been injured through their malfeasance, omission, or neglect, yet if the damages would have been sustained notwithstanding the malconduct of the officer, or if the injured
party has by his fault or neglect contributed to the result, the officer
cannot be held responsible: Lick v. Madden et at., 36 Cal.
SALE.
Conditional Sale of Personal Property- Title.-W here on sale of
personal property the right to receive payment before delivery is
waived by the seller, and immediate possession is given to the purchaser,
and yet by express agreement the title is to remain in the seller until
the payment of the price upon a fixed day, such payment is strictly a
condition precedent, and until performance the right of property is not
vested in the purchaser: Putnam v. Lamphier, 36 Cal.
It is a general rule, applicable alike to conditional and absolute sales,
that a second vendee is not entitled to stand in any better situation than
his vendor in regard to the title of personal property, other than negotiable instruments, and whatever comes under the general denomination
of currency : Id.
STAMP.

Unstampea Note.-A promissory note, made since the 30th day of
June, 1864, is not provided for in the Act of Congress of that date, and
cannot be'stamped in open court, and thus stamped, read as evidence to
the jury: Wigham v. Pickett, S. C. Ala.
But such note is not-void, unless it was left unstamped at the time it
was made, with the intent to defraud the government of its revenue.
Such fraudulent intent will not be presumed, but must be proved, as
any other fraud is proved: d.
Such note may be made available, as evidence, by having it stamped
by the collector of the revenue of the proper district, under section
158 of said act: Id.
SUNDAY.
See Limitations.
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TRUSTEE.

Creditors of Trust Estate.-Persons who have traded with and given
credit to the trustee of a married woman's separate estate, cannot, in
the first
instance, go into chancery to have their debts -paid out of the
trust estate : Pollard et al. v. Cleveland et al., S. C. Ala.
A trustee who is a member of a company, and as such member
becomes the seller, and as trustee the buyer, for and on account of the
trust estate, makes no exception to, liut rather a reason for the necessity
and propriety of the general rule : Id.
Statute of Frauds as to Resulting Trust.-Where A. agrees with .B.
that he will purchase from C., at a given price, a sheriff's certificate of
sale, which C. holds, of a tract of land, and that B. shall furnish onehalf of the money, and that the assignment of the certificate shall be
taken in A.'s name, for the joint benefit of A. and B., and B. furnishes
A. his proportion of the money, when in truth A. has already bought
the certificate unknown to B.: Held, that A. is estopped from alleging
that he had made the purchase before his agreement with B., and that
on this ground said agreement is within the Statute of Frauds, and does
not create a resulting trust: Dikeman v. Norrie., 36 Cal.
Where A. agrees with B. that he will purchase a sheriff's certificate of
sale of a mining claim, and take an assignment in his own name for the
joint benefit of both, and A. makes the purchase, B. furnishing his proportion of the money, and takes a sheriff's deed in his own name, a
resulting trust arises, and A. holds a part of the property in trust for
B.: Id.
Such resulting trust dannot be defeated by the fraud of A. in making
this agreement and taking B.'s money, when in fact he had already,
unknown to B., made the purchase: Id.
VENDOR AND

PURCHASER.

Vendor's Lien.-If the vendor deliver possession of the estate to the
vendee before all the purchase-money is paid, equity recognises and will
enforce a lien on the land as a security for such unpaid purchase-money;
and this is so whether the legal estate be or be not conveyed : ,Schwarz
v. Stein, 29 Md.
Such lien exists independent of any special agreement, and as an
incident to the contract of sale of real estate, and it exists not only
against the vendee and his heirs and other privies in estate, but against
those claiming as volunteers, judgment-creditors, and all subsequent
purchasers for value, having notice that the purchase-money or any part
thereof remains unpaid: Id.
" Where the vendor, claiming the benefit of the lien, retains the conveyance and holds in himself the legal title, subsequent purchasers or
mortgagees may be affected with notice of the lien for any l alance of
unpaid purchase-money: Id.
The general rule is that the purchaser of an equity is bound to take
notice of all prior equities: d.
Whether the lien has been waived is generally a question of intention,
to be determined from the special circumstances of each case; and it is
always incumbent upon the party resisting the lien, to show the facts
Id.
which repel its existence:
Where the deed was withheld until much the larger portion of the
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purchase-money was paid, and a promissory note for the balance, with
the endorsement of a third party thereon as security, was given; and the
deed was then delivered to the purchaser, and he was thus clothed with
the legal estate to deal with the same as he pleased. H el, that the lien
was extinguished, and the vendor must rely alone upon the personal
security taken for the balance of the purchase-money : Id.
Where the legal title has been conveyed to the vendee, and he has
given his note with the responsibility of a third person endorsed thereon
as security, the lien must be considered as having been waived or surrendered, unless there be an express agreement that it shall be retained:
Id.
Vendor's Lien-Against whom it may be enforced.-A vendor's lien
for the unpaid purchase price of land may be enforced against the vendee and his grantees who have notice of the vendor's equities: Pell v.
JAcElroy, 36 Cal.
The fact of notorious and exclusive possession of lands by a stranger
to a vendor's title, as of record, at the time of a purchase from and conveyance by such vendor out of possession, presumptively imparts notice
to such purchaser of the equitable rights in the premises of the party in
po~ession; and this presumption can only be rebutted on the part of
such purchaser, or those claiming under him, by explicit proof of diligent and unavailing effort by the vendee to discover or obtain actual
notice of any legal or
equitable rights in the premises in behalf of the
: Id.
party in possession
The continued adverse possession of lands by the vendor after his
formal conveyance of the legal title, is a fact in conflict with the legal
effect of his deed, and is presumptive evidence that he still retains an
interest in the premises, and is sufficient to put a purchaser upon inquiry,
and subjects him to the rule applicable in case of the party in possession
being a stranger to the title as of record: Id.
WILL.
Charge on Land.-" I give to Samuel the tract, &c., two horses, &c.;
I bequeath to Margaret $300, one bed and bedstead, to make her equal
with the rest; I leave to Daniel's children $30, to be divided equally
between them; all my money or bonds to pay my debts, and then all
my personal property to be sold and the money to be equally divided,"
&c. There was a deficiency of personal estate to pay all the legacies.
Held, that Margaret's bequest was not charged on Samuel's land : Okeson's Appeal, 59 Pa.
No particular language is necessary to create a charge on land; the
intention to charge is to be carried out whenever it is discoverable from
anything in the instrument: Id.
Commonwealth v. Shelby, 13 S. & R. 354, English v.. Harvey, 2
Rawle 309, explained: Id.
Whether an, Instrument is a Deed or Will.-Ritter conveyed land in
trust to be farmed, and from the proceeds to pay him an annuity during
life, the remainder of the income to his wife for life : if he survived
his wife all the proceeds to -him for life; after the death of both, the
land to be sold, a specified sum to be piid to three children named,
and the residue to be divided amongst all the children of Ritter and

